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Abstract
The central problem with understanding brain and mind is the neural code issue:
understanding the matter of our brain as basis for the phenomena of our mind.
The richness with which our mind represents our environment, the parsimony of
genetic data, the tremendous efficiency with which the brain learns from scant
sensory input and the creativity with which our mind constructs mental worlds
all speak in favor of mind as an emergent phenomenon. This raises the further
issue of how the neural code supports these processes of organization. The central
point of this communication is that the neural code has the form of structured net
fragments that are formed by network self-organization, activate and de-activate
on the functional time scale, and spontaneously combine to form larger nets with
the same basic structure.
The Mind-Body Problem
While I am writing this, I am sitting on a sun-bathed terrace surrounded by a
concrete piece of reality. Of course this reality, to the extent that it is accessible to
me, is a construct of my brain: whatever the brain doesn’t represent cannot touch
me. In the normal course of affairs this figment of our brain is what we take as
the reality per se. Only occasionally are we aware that the world out there and its
reflection in us are fundamentally different. Apart from basic matters of principle,
we are on the one hand always restricted to a small part of the world, being limited
to a moment and a place, limited moreover by our attention, which reflects only
part of what is perceptible. On the other hand our mind richly complements what
is given by our senses with valuations and imaginations: the situation means
something to us in the emotional sense and in the sense of opportunities to act,
and our imagination can liberate us from place and time, transporting us mentally
into real though distant, or possible or fanciful situations. On closer inspection
it isn’t even possible to make out a clear line between immediate reality and
imagination.
We receive through our senses only scant and incomplete signals, shadows on
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the wall of Plato’s cave. To construct from these a reality is possible only with
the help of constitutional assumptions (Kant’s a priori), with the help of masses
of memory traces accumulated over the years (as emphasized by the empiricists),
and with the help of extensive mental construction processes.
These construction processes are usually subconscious. One should, however,
think of the analogous and richly documented thought processes of mathematicians
and scientists when constructing their mental edifices (like algebra or geometry, or
the construction of geologic history out of myriads of single observations) in order
to appreciate the great importance of mental processes for the fabrication of our
inner reality.
For essential thinkers of the 17th century the nature of the inner and of the
(imagined) outer reality — Descartes’ res cogitans and res extensa — was so differ-
ent that Leibniz couldn’t help attributing the collaboration between his mind for-
mulating a letter and his hand writing that letter to divine intervention (”presta-
bilized harmony”). Spinoza, in contrast, saw brain and mind merely as different
perspectives on the same thing. Today, the dualism of Descartes and Leibniz is
seen as left behind and the accepted view is essentially that of Spinoza, although
the two perspectives — that of scalpel and electrode on the one hand and intro-
spection, psychophysics and psychology on the other — are still so different in
the mind of present-day scientists that they still are dualists for all intents and
purposes.
Isn’t now, after the preparatory work of the thinkers of the 17th, 18th and
early 19th century and after the theoretical and experimental achievements of the
late 19th, 20th and the incipient 21st century, isn’t now the time to solve the
mind-body problem, to describe the common ground behind the two perspectives,
so that their interrelation becomes clear? What shall we wait for? That the
solution is going to be forced on us by the simultaneous recording of the activity
of all neurons in the waking brain and the complete reconstruction of its synaptic
connections? The wiring diagram of the hermaphrodite form of the nematode
Caenorhabditis elegans has been known for many years, down to the naming of
all of the 302 neurons and to the more than 8000 synapses (White et al., 1986)
but the behavior of the worm is still not understood on this basis. As with
perception, experimental facts about brain and mind, the analog to the sensory
signal, are but shadows on the cave wall. In addition to experimental data it
needs effective a priori assumptions and active mental constructions in order to
decipher the process behind those two perspectives, brain and mind. Only this
triad — data, assumptions and mental construction — can be successful. Essential
breakthroughs of science, as Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism or Boltzmann’s
statistic-mechanical explanation of the thermal phenomena, emphasize especially
the significance of the third component, mental construction.
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The Neural Code Issue
I think this introduction makes in plain on what question we have to focus: how
does the matter of my brain generate the phenomena in my mind? How can a finite
material basis generate perceptions, the representation of reality and a universe
of imaginations, how does it engender consciousness and the quality of feelings?
This problem of the neural code has four inseparably intertwined aspects:
1. What is the nature of the state of the brain or mind at any given moment?
2. What is the nature of memory, whose structural fragments are so essential
for the construction of the state?
3. What is the mechanism through which experience and thought form memory
content? 1
Answering those four questions must, of course, be guided through observations
of material (physiological or anatomical) and mental (introspective, psychological
and psychophysical) kind. Prominent is the striking contrast between the seamless
unity we perceive in our inner being, in our consciousness, on the one hand and the
articulation of our nervous system into a tremendous number of building elements
on the other. The mind acts like a force that generates unity in this sack full
of fleas. The non-trivial nature of this achievement is made clear by neurological
malfunctions, which show how much our mind depends on the physical components
of the brain. Malfunctions caused by local lesions have been, by the way, very
helpful to appreciate mind as thematically articulated into modalities and sub-
modalities and to identify these articulations with regions of the brain. This
localization of contents and themes has eventually been refined down to the level
of individual neurons, each of which, it seems, is connected to an elementary theme
or feature, a stimulus to which it responds by firing or a motor pattern that it
triggers.
This observation gives part of an answer to the first of my questions, the nature
of the neural code: the mind can be decomposed into atoms, into elementary
symbols, and these correspond to neurons. It is very important, however, to
realize that as with all reduction of complex phenomena to simple building blocks
1When trying to emulate the function of the brain in the computer, more prosaic versions of
these questions offer themselves: What is the data format of brain state, what the data format of
memory, and, what are the algorithms or what is the form of the dynamical processes by which
those data objects are generated? I am mentioning the computer here because I do believe
that the questions I am discussing are clearly drifting towards a crisis, towards the realization
of artificial brains, designated by some as the Singularity. The signs of this crisis are, first,
an excitement and expectation gripping all of society under the names of digital revolution or
artificial intelligence, second, the availability of the necessary computing power (if still at much
too high cost, which is to be reduced drastically by a further technical revolution), third (driven
by said attitude of expectation) the emergence of broad application fields for artificial brains,
and finally, closely related to that, the availability of gigantic investment funds. In my view the
present situation may be likened to a huge body of water held back by a dam. All that is needed
to break this dam is giving correct answers to the neural code questions.
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(such as Life to molecules), this decomposition accomplishes only part of the task
of deciphering the neural code, the much more complex part having to deal with
the assembly of those elements into mental phenomena. This is only possible
in the context of answering the three other questions, especially those for the
mechanisms generating state and memory.
Important constraints come from observing the temporal behavior of the brain.
Preparation of spontaneous actions starts a little more than a second before exe-
cution (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965; Libet et al., 1983). The reaction of the brain
to new stimuli takes a large part of a second. The transmission of a nervous pulse
from one neuron to the next takes already some milliseconds. Well-prepared and
standardized processing steps take so little time (Potter and Levy, 1969; Thorpe
et al., 1996) that they seem to be realized through pure feed-forward waves of
neural activation. The process in the brain is usually interpreted as a sequence of
“psychological moments” (Block, 2014), each of which lasts one or two tenths of
a second and can, when concentrated on, be reflected as conscious state.
According to these temporal relations the bracket between elementary process-
ing steps and whole-system reactions is very tight, making clear that the generation
of coherent conscious states is not the result of long sequential reasoning. We may,
to be sure, also engage in long chains of reasoning, for instance in the context of
complex mathematical proofs. As we all know by introspection, however, these
are the result of a slow and rather chaotic process in which we visit the stations of
the reasoning chain in random sequence, slowly putting them in order in the pro-
cess. Only sometimes, after long intensive work we can imagine the whole chain
in front of our eyes as if it was simultaneous, as if we were viewing an image with
deliberately shifting gaze. Mozart is said to have once remarked that he was able
to hold a whole symphony simultaneously in his mind, a statement probably to
be interpreted in that same sense.
Brain States as Dynamical Attractors
From such contemplations of the temporal structure and the style of processes
in our brain we may conclude that the representation of a perceived or imagined
phenomenon, and indeed the entire conscious moment, are in their nature equilib-
rium states that are constituted through the interlocking of mutually consistent
forces. This may be likened to the lattice of a crystal, in which each molecule
is held in its position by the forces exerted by its neighbors, so that the whole
crystal has solid rigidity in spite of the weakness of the individual forces. This
image of a complex arrangement stabilized by mutually consistent interactions
seems to be highly appropriate to describe the character of the mental constructs
that we encounter in language, music and mathematics or in the representation of
our immediate environment.
Mathematics illustrates with particular intensity the stringency of the laws
that rule the realm of self-consistent fabrics. Thus it may be proved that besides
the five Platonic bodies there can be no others, or that there is a fixed set of
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periodic crystal lattice types. Natural numbers have a simple definition but their
peculiar properties are to this day the subject of research. It can be proven that
the two-dimensional field of complex numbers cannot have a three-dimensional
analog, but there is a four-dimensional one, Hamilton’s quaternions. In response
to this stubbornness of their subject mathematicians feel they are discovering
pre-existing structures instead of inventing them. These structures are entirely
determined by the constraint of consistency, of absence of self-contradiction. If
one comes near enough to one of those fabrics, it takes control and dictates the
detail of its own structure.
This image of “taking control” is, I feel, highly appropriate to approach also
the mechanisms that are responsible for the generation of ordered brain states,
especially of conscious moments, and of stable mental constructs in memory. Un-
fortunately, mathematicians are hermetically reticent when it comes to describing
the history of their own discoveries (for a nice exception, though, see Poincare´
(1973)). One therefore has to look for physical processes putting in evidence the
generation of self-consistent structures. Crystallization is, unfortunately, not ap-
propriate for this purpose, as the generation of a regular molecular lattice is a very
sequential process.
An instructive metaphor, however, is the Be´nard system: a pan, filled with
some liquid like oil, heated from below. When the heat at the bottom is slowly
increased, so that the temperature gradient in the oil is made to surpass a certain
threshold, the initially immobile liquid starts to agitate, some irregular motion
patterns form, and under the influence of the acting forces (gravity, pressure,
viscosity, surface tension), they become more and more pronounced and regular.
Under sufficiently homogeneous conditions one can see honeycomb patterns de-
velop, highly regular arrays of hexagonal convection cells, in the center of each of
which the liquid rises and near the walls of which it moves downward. What dis-
tinguishes the winning pattern from its similar competitors is that it is optimal in
the sense of mutual consistency of the participating forces, it has “taken control”
and, amplifying itself, prevails.
To generate global order, forces (which typically have short range) have to
interlink in long chains. This is bound to take time. The temporal process of
pattern formation has, however, nothing to do with the deterministic chain of
steps of an algorithm or with a sequential chain of reasoning. It rather is a chaotic
sequence of immature, partially consistent patterns, which evolves in the sense of
growing consistency (the analogy to an evolving eco-system is not inappropriate
here at all).
The forces shaping memory
Before we can apply the metaphor of pattern formation to the brain we have to re-
turn to the question regarding the nature of the neural code. Let’s first talk about
the code of memory. I follow the general conviction that memory is represented
in the brain in the form of excitatory connections between neurons (assuming
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for simplicity that inhibitory connections only play a role in housekeeping). The
strengths of excitatory connections are modified by synaptic plasticity (extending
that concept also to the making and breaking of connections).
While for the purpose of shaping the neural activity state of the brain, connec-
tions are to be seen as forces (analogous to the viscosity etc. of Be´nard’s pattern
formation), for memory connections are constituent elements, that is, the material
to be shaped. What, then, are the forces between connections that are responsi-
ble for forming memory? And, what is consistency between those forces? Before
answering these questions, let’s briefly consider the purpose of neural connectivity
patterns, of memory. This purpose is to give shape to the rapidly changing brain
states, making fragments of previously built imaginations available as components
of new states. To serve this purpose the structure of active brain states has to be
imprinted upon the connections so that memory fragments can be generated and
shaped.
Memory formation is the result of long sequences of brain states, which act
through their statistics on the connections (disregarding for the moment episodic
memory formation in hippocampus or the rather rare occurrence of imprinting).
In this process, which may be called network self-organization, the connectivity
structure of the network on the one hand and the neural signal statistics on the
other mutually adapt to better and better support each other. Network self-
organization is driven by an elementary feed-back loop: An excitatory connection
between two neurons increases the probability of their “simultaneous” (meaning,
only slightly delayed) firing, and in return the simultaneous firing of the neurons
increases the strength of the connection. The mechanism is called Hebbian plastic-
ity. This growth of synapses has to be tamed by regulatory mechanisms that keep
the average activity of individual neurons constant (as described, for instance, in
Triesch (2007)).
The formative interactions between synaptic connections can, accordingly, be
described as follows. A single synaptic connection is too weak to excite the target
neuron beyond its threshold; for that, several fibers converging on a target neuron
have to fire simultaneously (Abeles, 1991). There will, of course, have to be
a cause for this simultaneity of firing, which ultimately is a common upstream
signal source. A decisive role in this context therefore is played by a number of
signal pathways like these two
a → b′
↓ ↓
a′ → b
between neurons a and b. Alternative pathways mutually increase their success in
firing the target neuron, here b, and are in this sense cooperative. On the other
hand the target neuron, as remarked in the last paragraph, limits the number and
strength of its input connections, see Siddoway et al. (2014), which leads to compe-
tition between the fibers converging upon a neuron and the eventual elimination of
those that are rarely active. As a consequence, relatively few connections converge
on any given neuron, or in other words, self-organized networks are sparse.
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The cerebral cortex is a richly interconnected structure in which these mecha-
nisms can play out freely. From the above arguments it follows that cortex is dom-
inated by connectivity structures that are optimal in the sense of those two kinds
of interaction between connections, cooperation and competition. Such structures
and their generation have been described within the visual system, involving espe-
cially the ontogeny of retinotopy (Willshaw and von der Malsburg, 1976; Goodhill,
2007). These theoretical models and a number of others with the same basic struc-
ture are in accordance with scores of experimental observations, can thus be taken
as compact renderings of those experiments, and the underlying concepts are now
common knowledge. A prominent role is played by two-dimensionally extended
nets with short-range excitatory connections, so-called neural fields (Wilson and
Cowan, 1972; von der Malsburg, 1973; Amari, 1977) and topological (retinotopic)
fiber projections between two such neural fields. Both structures are composed of
meshes of the kind described above, see Figure 1, and are optimal in the sense of
cooperation and competition.
Fig. 1: Two types of net structures. Left and right: two-dimensional neural
fields. The other type has the form of topological mappings between neural fields,
mappings connecting neighboring (that is, connected) neurons in one sheet with
neighboring neurons in the other (most connections pale for clarity).
The Nature of the Neural Code
Before discussing network structure any further, we have to revisit question Nr.
1 above, which we have left in a very unfinished state: the issue of the code of
the brain state, of the mode of representation of live mental content. As I wrote
a long time ago (von der Malsburg, 1981), it is not enough to see the mind’s
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state decomposed into elementary symbols, it also needs a means to compose
those elementary symbols in hierarchically structured fashion so as to form more
complex symbols, all the way up to the representation of the currently active
conscious state. This issue has become known as the binding problem (Burwick,
2014; Feldman, 2013). It will have to be solved in close coordination with the other
three issues, the mechanism generating those complex symbols, the structure of
memory and the mechanism of memory formation.
Here is my proposal for the form of the neural code. The brain state is de-
scribed by the set of currently active elementary symbols and the set of currently
active connections between them. The latter statement assumes, in radical de-
viation from current convictions, that physically existing connections can switch
on and off as quickly as neurons. Connections can, however, not be activated
in arbitrary combination but only in arrangements that have been structured by
network self-organization. Accordingly I postulate that the permanent set of cor-
tical connections is an overlay of well-structured net fragments, well-structured in
the sense of having been created and being stabilized by self-organization. Active
brain states are, according to this picture, generated by the activation of a subset
of the net fragments that make up memory. However, net fragments cannot be
activated in arbitrary combination but only such as to complement each other to
form optimal (in the above sense) larger nets. From now on I will imply by “net”
or “net fragment” networks that are near-optimal in the sense of cooperation and
competition between their connections.
Let’s consider the situation from the point of view of memory. Memory consists
of the set of permanent, that is, only slowly changing, connections. Again and
again, the course of time, subsets of the connections are activated. While these are
active they are plastically modified in the direction of optimality, that is, towards
improved mutual consistency. In this sense the four neural code questions are
closely intertwined: Active brain states are part-activations of memory, memory is
restructured by the statistics of neural activity, and both, brain state and memory,
have the structure of nets.
Implementation of Rapidly Switching Connections
I am advocating here as central element of the neural code the rapid activation and
de-activation of neural connections. This is far from being a generally accepted
feature of the neural paradigm and I would like to put out of the way possible
serious reservations the reader may bear against this point. I see two mechanisms
at work, which both have long been discussed and are based on known neurophys-
iological mechanisms.
• Multi-Cellular Units (see Fig.2): An elementary symbol, a feature, may be
redundantly represented by a set of alternate neurons of the same meaning.
Let’s call such a set a multicellular unit. The different neurons of the set
may, however, be distinguished by their connections to and from neurons in
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Fig. 2: Overlay of Nets. A two-dimensional sheet (only a one-dimensional cross
section is shown for clarity) is populated by multicellular units (minicolumns). All
neurons in one unit have identical external connections (identical receptive field
in the case of primary visual cortex). Inhibition within units makes sure that in a
stable state only one neuron can be active (“winner-take-all” inhibition). In a given
situation, a subset of the units is actually receiving input (units in foreground,
shown enlarged). As the result of learning and self-organization, there exists a net
comprising one of the neurons in each activated unit. Due to this net the connected
neurons win the competition within their units. The figure shows a second net
(involving mostly units in the background). Different nets may share a given
unit, involving different of its neurons (as in the third unit from the left) or even
the same neuron (as in the fifth unit from the right). Redundant representation
of features by multiple neurons per unit is necessary to avoid cross-talk between
patterns that have many features (units) in common.
other multicellular units. At first a signal from a sensory organ (if the multi-
cellular unit lies in a primary sensory area) or from another part of cortex will
excite all neurons in the unit the same way, but in a second moment one of
them (or a small subset) will receive “lateral” excitatory input from neurons
in other units. If an inhibitory system of the winner-take-all type reigns
between the neurons in a given unit, then the activity of all those neurons
that receive little or no lateral excitation will be suppressed and only one
or a small subset of neurons in the multicellular unit will remain active. As
result, the elementary symbols that are represented by multicellular units
of this structure have variable connectivity, realized by selective activation
of neurons with corresponding permanent connections, see figure 2. Such
units may in the cortex be realized by the so-called minicolumns (Peters
and Yilmaze, 1993). In the framework of associative memory this kind of
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structure has been proposed for the purpose of de-correlating memory traces
(see, for instance, Hirahara et al. (1997)).
• Control Units: As has been proposed under the name of sigma-pi neurons
(Rumelhart and McClelland, 1987), the effectiveness of a synaptic connection
can be controlled by other synapses that connect to the same patch of the
target dendrite if that patch has an activation threshold (Polsky et al., 2004).
Whole bundles of projection fibers to different neurons may thus be switched
by individual “control units”, as has been proposed by Charles Anderson
(Anderson and Van Essen, 1987).
Fig. 3: Control Units Gate Projection Fibers. Left Panel: Synapses of projec-
tion fibers (coming from the left) are co-located with synapses of control neuron
(single sphere) on target neurons (on the right). Only when the control neuron
is active, signals of projection fibers can excite target neurons, due to threshold
non-linearity of dendritic patches on which synapses of projection fibers and of
the control neuron are co-located. Control neurons get excited in proportion to
the similarity of the activation pattern on the projection fibers to the activation
pattern on the target neurons (fibers of control neurons are assumed to conduct
in both directions.) Right Panel: There are several (two in the figure) sets of pro-
jection fibers, each of them gated by their own control unit. Control neurons of
mutually inconsistent projection fiber sets (as in this case) inhibit each other, con-
trol neurons of mutually consistent fiber sets (which form a coherent topological
mapping, not shown) excite each other.
One may hope that within a few years the methodology of connectomics will
be developed to the point of revealing the structure of the permanent cortical
connectivity as overlay of nets.
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Significance
How can a system that is dominated by mechanical laws, and for whose exposition
I have only talked about form and not content, let alone about any relation to
the environment, how can such a system develop intentionality and relevance to
the world, how can it carry meaning, sentience, consciousness or express qualia?
This is, of course, the hard core of the mind-body problem: how can, in the sense
of Spinoza, a material brain be seen as identical in essence with a mind, in what
sense can one come to identify Descartes’ res extensa with his res cogitans?
The central point to be elucidated is how the mechanics of the mind and the
mechanics of the material building elements of the brain correspond to each other.
The movement of formal mathematics attempted something like this (if in rather
unsatisfactory way) by replacing intuition by mechanical rules of symbol manipu-
lation. This would be more convincing if also intuition itself and the interpretation
of symbols were realized as a formal system (although this would run counter to
the intention of the formal mathematicians, who wanted to eliminate intuition):
but this must exactly be our aim.
It is my fundamental claim here that any kind of content and meaning can be
represented by the proposed neural code, in the form of active elementary propo-
sitions and structured relations between them, that is, by graphs. The perhaps
unfamiliar aspect is that connections are not restricted to the ancillary role of
transmitting signals between neurons but are themselves dynamical variables on
the time scale of brain states and act as active carriers of meaning in addition to
their signal transmission function.
Example: Invariant Object Recognition
Let me illustrate this with a simple example. As we know, retinal images appear
in primary visual cortex as two-dimensional arrays of activated neurons, each
sensitive to a local texture element appearing in its receptive field. The number
of primary-cortical neurons is larger than the number of retinal output neurons
by a factor of well over one hundred2. We also know that primary visual cortex
abounds in lateral short-range connections between its neurons. It then seems
rather natural to expect that after some learning and network self-organization in
early life primary visual cortex assumes net structure, such that within the range
of lateral connections (larger than receptive field sizes by some factor, say, five)
all statistically significant image patch patterns are represented by net fragments
that are kept separate in multi-cellular unit fashion, see Figure 2. Over larger
distances these fragments cover images as a seamless mosaic, thus representing
the image of an object as “image net”.
In order to recognize an image, I posit, there needs to be, somewhere in the
2The number of neurons in human primary visual cortex has been estimated at 140 Million
(Leuba and Kraftsik, 1994) and the number of human retinal output fibers at around 1 Million
(Curcio and Allen, 1990).
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brain, a “model net” that is homeomorphic3 to the image net in primary visual
cortex. The model net itself is embedded as fragment in a memory holding many
such nets, and is held together not only by the short-range connections of the
homeomorphism but also by additional longer-range connections giving the net
global coherence.
The mappings between images and models are themselves to be realized as net
fragments, “maplets” (Anderson and Van Essen, 1987; Zhu and von der Malsburg,
2004). A maplet is a set of projection fibers connecting a small patch of the input
sheet (primary visual cortex) to a patch in the model sheet (the memory con-
taining known patterns, the fusiform complex holding facial models in the human
brain, for instance), maplet fibers connecting neighboring positions to neighboring
positions. Maplets are switched by control units, as proposed in Anderson and
Van Essen (1987), see Figure 3. Maplet control units are excited in proportion to
the similarity between the activity pattern on the controlled projection fibers on
the one hand and the activity pattern on the target neurons on the other. Con-
trol units for competing maplets (that project from different image patches to the
same model patch) inhibit each other, whereas control units that are consistent
with each other (their maplets together forming a smooth topological mapping)
excite each other. The recognition process has to solve a chicken-and-egg problem,
simultaneously having to home in to a definite mapping and activating a matching
model in memory (or even composing the model from fragments). That this is
possible has been shown by simulations of a complete face recognition system real-
ized in this style see (Wolfrum et al., 2008). For a schematic of the final composite
net activated during face recognition see Figure 4.
As images in retina and primary visual cortex transform with movements of
objects and eye, a continuum of possible mappings must be held available to cover
ranges of positions, sizes, orientations and deformations. By composing mappings
between whole figures out of relatively small maplets, the high-dimensional space
of possible mappings can be controlled by a finite set of control units, each one
gating one of the maplets (Wolfrum and von der Malsburg, 2007; Fernandes and
von der Malsburg, 2015).
As I wrote above, active connections are themselves carriers of meaning. As
illustrated in (von der Malsburg and Bienenstock, 1987; Bienenstock and von der
Malsburg, 1987), quite different images can be represented and recognized al-
though they are formed by the same set of feature neurons, differing only in the
way these neurons are connected with each other. These connections constitute
the two-dimensional extendedness of images, not just in the eyes of an external
beholder but in a very effective sense: The net fragments of image, mapping and
model can be composed to a larger net only on the basis of structural consistency,
3 I am defining two nets to be homeomorphic if a one-to-one mapping can be found such that
each neuron in one net maps one-to-one to a neuron of the same type in the other such that
laterally connected neurons are mapped onto laterally connected neurons. Both nets may be
sub-nets of larger nets. The term homeomorphism is just meant as an allusion to mathematical
ideas. A more formal definition will need to take into account the graded nature of the level of
mutual consistency of nets.
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Fig. 4: Example Face Recognition. Left Panel: Retinal images get represented
in primary visual cortex as two-dimensional arrays of activated neurons, each
representing a local texture element (nodes and links symbolically stand for a much
denser net). Right Panel: Model of a face, in another part of the brain (fusiform
complex) in the same basic format. Connecting Lines: Homeomorphic mapping,
connecting feature neurons of the same type and with the same connections. All
three networks have consistent net structure and they form a composite with net
structure.
of homeomorphism.
Similarly, also the active projection fibers between image and model carry
meaning, by connecting corresponding features in image and model and thus rep-
resenting this mapping and identification. Also the interactions between these
fibers is significant. Valid fiber projections connect neighboring neurons in one
structure with neighboring neurons in the other (neighborhood being defined by
active connections) and thus consist of many meshes of the kind
a ←→ b
l l
a′ ←→ b′
(where a and a′ are in the image and b and b′ in the model). These are composed
of cooperating signal pathways of the kind a→ b→ b′ and a→ a′ → b′, while the
competition between projection fibers that diverge from one point in the image
or that converge on one point in the model is important for compliance with the
one-to-one structure of the mapping. These interactions between projection fibers
play the central role during the slow self-organization of fiber projections to be
alternatively activated under control, as modeled in detail in (Zhu et al., 2010;
Bergmann and von der Malsburg, 2011; Fernandes and von der Malsburg, 2015).
13
Such mappings make the essence of the structural relations between image
and model concrete. Already in themselves they form an indispensable kind of
information, as argued convincingly by (Arathorn, 2002) in his introduction. The
images appearing in primary visual cortex are grossly distorted due to the foveal
inhomogeneity and other factors. These distortions have to be compensated by
the fiber projections to the model domain in order to re-establish the metric rela-
tions in the world. This is possible on the basis of the a priori assumption that
the metrics of the world are invariant to eye movements and ego motions, thus
constituting the geometry of the visual space, according to Felix Klein’s Erlangen
program, as demonstrated in (Zhu et al., 2010; Bergmann and von der Malsburg,
2011; Fernandes and von der Malsburg, 2015).
By connecting the image in the primary visual cortex with an abstract model
(abstract in the sense of disregarding position, size and orientation of the retinal
image) the image acquires the meaning that is implicit in the rich associations of
the model with the rest of the brain. The information suppressed in the model is
not lost, as the (bidirectional) fiber projection between model and image are the
basis for identifying model components with image positions, and the position,
size and orientation of the image are encoded by the map control space, under
alternative abstraction disregarding the structure of the image.
Schema Matching as Basis of Intelligence
Object recognition as just described can be taken as example for a central aspect of
intelligence, the recognition of abstract schemata in concrete situations. Schemata
have long been proposed as essential ingredients of cognition and behavioral con-
trol. Jean Piaget and Bartlett (1932) are often cited as important proponents of
the concept.
A mind may be called intelligent if it has a large repertoire of schemata together
with the ability to recognize and apply these in a wide array of situations. The
higher the level of abstraction of a schema the wider its scope. The recognition of a
schema in a situation typically suggests possible actions, it helps to focus attention
on elements that are missing according to the schema, and is the basis for finding
in memory other situations that are analogous in the sense of the schema. Schema
application (though not under that name) is the central skill of a jurist, to be able
to recognize, in a given social situation, appropriate precedents or clauses in the
code of law under which the situation can be subsumed.
A given schema may be instantiated in many concrete situations. Conversely,
a given situation may arouse several schemata, and indeed only through a number
of interlocking schemata can it be constituted and grasped. Schemata may be
seen as concepts while the representation of situations rich in detail may be seen
as the domain of intuition. Concepts without intuition are empty, intuition with-
out concepts is blind, wrote Kant. Concepts give to perception significance and
meaning, and conversely abstract concepts acquire content only through concrete
instances.
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Although the concept of the schema has been discussed in the context of neural
theory (Arbib, 1992; Rumelhart et al., 1987), its implementation in neural net-
works has remained elusive. This difficulty is due to the lack of dynamic relations
as part of the usual data structure of neural networks.
Schemas have played an important role in classical artificial intelligence, under
various names such as frames (Minsky, 1974) or scripts (Schank and Abelson,
1977), see also (Winograd, 1971), but their implementation has never gone beyond
hand-crafted demonstrators. Overcoming this limit needs a generic data structure
for schemata, instances and mappings between them as well as a concept of self-
organization to create them and let them interact.
Self-organized nets is the perfect medium to implement schemata and their
interaction with instances. The fundamental nature of the relation of a schema
to its instance is homeomorphy. Let N and S be the nets that represent the
situation and the schema, respectively. One can speak of homeomorphy if it is
possible to find a sub-net N ′ of N such that there is a one-to-one mapping between
same-type pairs of elements in N ′ and S fulfilling the condition that connected
elements in N ′ are mapped to connected elements in S. The composite net formed
by N ′, the mapping net and S will again be entirely composed of meshes of the
kind shown above. A homeomorphy relation is only significant if both N and S
are sufficiently sparse networks (homeomorphic mappings between fully connected
networks are trivial, ambiguous and meaningless). Although the general problem
of sub-graph matching is intractable (Garey and Johnson, 1979), mappings can
be found efficiently for network structures of specific kinds (like planar graphs)
or between labeled graphs. Mapping between two-dimensional fields of typed
neurons, as in the example of object recognition (Wolfrum et al., 2008), or even
between fields of untyped neurons (Ha¨ussler and von der Malsburg, 1983) shows
that matching can be efficient.
The Attention Focus and its Background
Only a small sector of a visual scene is concrete and detailed in our inner repre-
sentation. As soon as the gaze or even attention is turned away from an object
this object falls back onto a more abstract level, an object category, a position in
space or a role in a functional schema. In fact, the brain state tends to be a whole
hierarchy of layers from the concrete to the abstract, from broad context to the
current focus of attention. This goes along with a hierarchy of timescales, from
slow (hours, even days) for the broadest context to fractions of a second for focal
attention. Several contexts may coexist, the mind switching between them. It is
not clear to me whether the broader contexts are to be counted as primed (that
is, easily awakened) memory or as part of the active state. It is also not clear
to me whether the slower time constants are represented in synapses (possibly,
short-lived synapses) or in neurons with heightened excitability or actual activity.
These issues are relevant for the question of whether network self-organization and
learning are restricted to the conscious focus of attention or may, to some extent,
also take place in the subconscious halo. There are many reports of learning with-
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out conscious attention, but more importantly we all experience that sleeping over
an issue or putting an issue on the back burner may clarify things in our mind,
see, e.g., (Poincare´, 1973). For a modeling study which showed improvement of
functionality in a “sleep” mode see (Jitsev and von der Malsburg, 2010).
It is clear, in any case, that besides the representation of context there is a
broad halo of tentative activity. As I will discuss below, sensory signals leave wide
ranges of possible interpretations. From these the mind has to sift those that are
consistent with each other and with the context. For this to be possible, all those
tentative hypotheses must get excited, and out of this cloud of activity a small
subset survives, supported by net fragments connecting them with each other and
with the context.
Consciousness
The conscious state is characterized by a net that comprises a critical mass of
modalities. Usually we require consciousness to describe a situation in space and
time, including a more or less concrete agenda of the individual, that it defines the
own situation in its relation to current events and to other persons or agents, and
in any case that a memory protocol permits continuity in time over a hierarchy of
time scales. As I have pointed out before (von der Malsburg, 1997), the essence
of consciousness is the brain state’s coherence in terms of content over a critical
minimum of modalities. What I have to add here is a definition of “coherence in
terms of content”: a modality-spanning consistency of signal pathways, meaning
near-optimal net structure.
Against this background I will attempt now to approach the problem of qualia,
the significance of the sensation of, e.g., a specific color or pain. If indeed our mind
can be described as nothing but the coming and going of nets, there can be only one
answer to this question, however unsatisfied it may leave us: When my attention
is directed at a specific stimulus its significance is completely contained in the
cascades of complex symbols, represented by active nets, that are excited directly
or indirectly by that stimulus.
Let’s take as example the bodily sensation of a pain stimulus. It immediately
captures the attention, the body reacts (through reflex arcs) with evasive motions
and possibly with systemic reactions as discharge of adrenalin, breaking out into
a sweat, or even shock. The pain sensation is specific in terms of quality and body
location, it gets complemented with associations with similar sensations in the
past, with attempts to identify a possible cause and with imaginations of possible
harmful consequences and of strategies for getting rid of the cause of the pain.
The whole event is orchestrated by a complex of behavioral schemata which at
first are genetically determined but in the course of individual development get
differentiated. The fundamental aspect of this behavioral schema is that pain is
the opposite of pleasure, that the avoidance of pain is placed high in the behavioral
agenda and can be displaced from the position of highest degree of attention only
by presently more urgent matters. All of this gives pain its substance and quality.
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The essence of pain doesn’t lie in the original signal of the pain fibers but in the
cascade of activated reactions, such as the significance of the shot in Sarajewo lay
in the World War it triggered.
Significance in brain and mind is not to be sought in specific sensory energies,
that is, qualities of the original signals as Johannes Mu¨ller saw it (Mu¨ller, 1840).
This insight forces on us the conclusion that the specifics of sensations, qualia, are
to be found in patterns of relations.
The Relationship between World and Brain
In the last section I have treated significance as something confined to the brain.
What is to be said, however, about significance in relation to the world out there,
how can a system as described be intentional? This question involves, again, the
four questions concerning the nature and generation of the neural code.
The basis for this relation must be a fundamental structural trait of the world
that the brain has been able to capture. The concrete mug on the table in front
of me exists only once in the world. Of my brain, however, I expect that it learns
from the objects, structures, situations etc., encountered in the past to be able
to interact with new situations. That, of course, is possible only in a world that
is pervaded by deep structural relations. The possibility of describing ever new
sections of a practically infinite world on a finite basis, a finite brain, suggests that
both, world and brain, are compositional (as linguists express it), meaning that
they can be decomposed into a finite set of recurring fragments that combine in
regular ways into hierarchies of complex structures.
Vision as Inverted Computer Graphics
Over the last two decades, computer graphics has developed the ability to
generate very realistic-looking scenes of infinite diversity. The structures and
processes that computer graphics is using for this purpose may be interpreted as
an ontology of the visual world. If we were able to invert the generative process
of computer graphics, that is, were able to derive scene descriptions from visual
input, we would obtain a model of visual perception, if not of cognition.
To achieve that, a fundamental difficulty has to be overcome. While the visual
scene generates sensory signals in a deterministic process (modeled in computer
graphics), the inverse of this process has to search through masses of hypotheses
to recover the right combination of scene elements. It is as with riddles, which
at first confront the mind with an immense number of combinations of possible
structural elements from which the one is to be selected that unequivocally solves
the riddle.
How does all of that translate into the language of net fragments and their in-
teraction? The structures and processes of computer graphics can be interpreted
as net fragments (although here is not the place to expand on this), so the problem
is to find an arrangement of known fragments that fit together to form a globally
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Fig. 5: A Visual Architecture. A range of modalities (visual motion, depth, shape,
reflectance, ...) are represented by two-dimensional sheets, each point of which is
occupied by a local feature space (1D for depth, 2D for motion, 3D for color, 40D,
say, for texture etc.). The modality sheets contain memory, being rich overlays
of nets representing known patterns. The sheets are linked by “constraint nets”
connecting corresponding points (that is, points referring to the same position
on a surface in front of the eyes). Constraint nets represent possible feature
constellations in the different modalities, that is, constellations that occur with
statistical significance and have formed fragments of consistent nets. The visual
input is highly ambiguous and excites many alternative feature hypotheses in the
modalities. This cloud of possibilities collapses under two influences: neurons
representing alternative (mutually exclusive) feature values inhibit each other,
whereas neurons standing for compatible feature values are connected by nets and
excite each other. The collapse to an unambiguous interpretation of the visual
input is driven by dynamic attraction towards a temporary global net composed
of many stored and mutually consistent net fragments. This net wins out against
many less consistent net combinations in a process that may be called a non-serial
search.
consistent net that explains the sensory input. Explaining the input means re-
producing it or, given unavoidable delays, predicting its continuous change. The
visual process (or more generally, perception) thus proceeds by first letting the
sensory input create a tremendous cloud of activated neurons, then rapidly col-
lapsing it, leaving active only those neurons that support each other by previously
learned nets. For the schematic of a system architecture that would support this
process of visual perception see Figure 5.
Relationship to Other Methods of Uncertainty Handling
The uncertainty collapse just described must be seen in the context of the vast
literature on different methods and ideas concerning uncertainty handling. It is
too vast to be reviewed here, so let me just mention some of the relevant terms:
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relaxation labeling, (deep) belief networks, Bayesian estimation, Dempster-Shafer
theory, particle filters, graphical models, Kalman filters, Hidden Markov Models or
Minimal Free Energy. The critical issues by which these differ from each other are
the status and the interpretation of probability, the representation of uncertainty,
the question of how to combine evidence, issues concerning representation of state
on the one hand and of knowledge on the other, issues concerning the acquisition
of knowledge, and the status of a priori knowledge.
Common to most if not all of these conceptual frameworks is a clear distinc-
tion between the representation of the rapidly changing situation-dependent state
and the representation of static or slowly changing knowledge. The canonical ver-
sion of neural networks represents the former by time-dependent neural activity
and the latter by connections between them. Uncertainty is represented by ac-
tivity distributions over ranges of neurons (or in other systems over continuous
idealizations of such ranges), and knowledge in the form of fixed connections (or
generalized versions thereof) serves to let mutually consistent neurons excite each
other or inconsistent neurons inhibit each other.
The system I am proposing here deviates most strikingly from others by letting
the state variables select from the knowledge pool of neural connections a subset to
form the currently active net. In the final, collapsed, state only those connections
remain active that are relevant to the current situation. The switching off of
currently irrelevant connections frees the state from the influence of knowledge that
belongs to other contexts. The selection criterion for connections to be co-active is
that they be consistent with each other, that is, minimally self-contradictory. The
efficiency of the system is due to the existence of pre-computed net fragments that
have been shaped by slow self-organization to be self-consistent. This requirement
of self-consistency is a tremendously powerful a priori assumption absent from
other systems.
Like in other systems, uncertainty is represented by the superposition of neu-
rons representing competing hypotheses, but here also by the superposition of
connections (represented by neurons as well, see the section Implementation of
Rapidly Switching Connections). This cloud of activity is collapsed, by inhibition
and dynamic instability, leaving at the end a net of neurons and connections that
support each other, meaning that they are consistent with each other in the light
of previously assembled knowledge. As to the acquisition of knowledge, see the
following section on learning.
The system proposed here also differs markedly from other systems in terms
of its data format of state, structured nets. This lets it differ from most others
by being compositional, representing the required hierarchies of sub-patterns and
patterns not in terms of high-level units, each sub-pattern and pattern requir-
ing a dedicated separate unit, but by linking together units of lowest rank so as
to form structured net fragments. Net fragments seamlessly merge together to
form higher-level, larger fragments in a situation-dependent way, thus supporting
the spontaneous formation of complex high-level representations for phenomena
encountered for the first time.
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Finally, one word about interpreting the uncertainty distributions that per-
ception has to deal with as probabilities, and interpreting knowledge in terms of
conditional probabilities, as is customary in Bayesian estimation. Of course there
are phenomena, like gambling, where probabilities have objective meaning and it
pays to calculate them lege artis. There is, however, no reason to take said un-
certainties as probability distributions, no more than giving attempts at solving a
riddle probability status. Given sufficiently rich sensory input and sufficient time,
the end result of the perceptual process is a matter of certainty: explaining the
input is only possible on the basis of a proper model of the causes behind the
sensory patterns, and usually it is not the most likely but the only possible way
to do so. If there is lack of sufficient sensory information our brain often concocts
one possible interpretation and lets us take it as reality, without any indication
of a probability value. When the uncertainty reaches conscious level we attempt
to deal with probabilities but are notoriously bad at computing them properly. I
therefore see no reason to burden the process of uncertainty handling in a cognitive
system, natural or artificial, with the intricacies of probability calculus, especially
the need to normalize probabilities to one.
Learning
Perception is possible only if the brain already contains appropriate structural
fragments. Deducing from a flat image the geometry of a scene, for instance,
requires fragments that are recognizable on the basis of their two-dimensional
aspect but contain in addition depth information. This poses the learning problem:
how do these fragments, how does this information enter the mind?
As the bulk of our knowledge about the world has to enter our brain through
perception we have here a serious chicken-and-egg problem: no perception without
pre-existing fragments, no fragment formation without perception. Two aspects
are essential for understanding the solution to this impasse: Proper preparation of
the brain and specific structure of the nursery in which the individual’s perception
and mind are fostered.
Some structures that prepare the brain for its expected environment:
i Important sensory organs — retina, skin and cochlea — are spatially struc-
tured, reflecting the coherence of the world.
ii Different senses react to essentially different aspects of the world.
iii Efferent signals influence body motions.
iv The individual is genetically endowed with a repertoire of abstract schemata
and corresponding reaction patterns.
As to the structure of the nursery, the following aspects may be essential:
a The environment is composed of a hierarchy of recurring structural frag-
ments.
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b Contact with the world is articulated in a natural way by the individual’s
position and by time.
c The immediate environment tends to be static on a short time scale.
d Events, especially motion of individual objects, interrupt the temporal and
spatial continuity.
Point a is evidently fundamental for the perceptibility of the world. It will not
be so easy to be fully fathomed, but in the meantime I am basing this essay on
the central thesis that all accessible aspects of the world can be described in the
brain by nets, by coherent fabrics of net fragments.
Point b is the precondition for a finite brain to grasp the immensity of the
world, by putting it through the funnel of individual situations. As even a given
situation contains too much substance, the brain continues the decomposition by
focusing senses and attention and selecting and coherently representing functional
components.
The structuring of attention is supported by the spontaneous occurrence of
events and movements of objects (point d) and by the movements caused by the
individual (point iii), of the hands in front of the eyes or parallactic shifts caused
by ego-motion. Due to genetically induced mechanisms every change in the envi-
ronment attracts attention, and all sensory signals that are simultaneous with it
are associated as belonging together4. Human infants and many animals stabilize
the static background by staring, so that the immobile background can be sup-
pressed by temporal filtering. Moving objects escape this filtering, stand out as
significant patterns on the basis of this “common fate” of their parts and can as
such be extracted and stored from single occurrence, (cf. Loos and von der Mals-
burg (2002)). After a sufficient variety of objects have thus be recorded, other
Gestalt rules besides common fate can be derived, as illustrated in basic form in
(Tang and von der Malsburg, 2008).
Although sensory signals contain information about the structure of the world,
they are also potently determined by perspective transformations. Thus, the reti-
nal position of the image of an object is determined by eye movements, its size and
orientation by distance and rotation of the object or the head around the viewing
axis while rotation of the object in depth alters the internal structure of the image.
Similar things are to be said about other senses, for instance the influence of hand
movements on tactile form perception, but I am restricting myself here to vision.
The topology of object surfaces is preserved by eye optics in the activity pat-
terns of the retina, and due to short-range connections in the retina (point i)
this topology is imprinted in the form of temporal signal correlations on the sig-
4That different sensory or motor signals connected with the same external event are simul-
taneous is the original source of information on what has to do with what and is the archetype
of temporal binding. Simultaneity of signals arriving at a neuron are also the basis for network
self-organization in general. They signal common origin in upstream events, though the over-
whelming majority of the events driving network self-organization are spontaneously created
inside the system.
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nals reaching the brain. The target structures of retinal fiber projections are in
natural way homeomorphic to the retinal net, which is the basis for ontogenetic
network self-organization (Willshaw and von der Malsburg, 1976; Goodhill, 2007),
resulting in retinotopic projections, which in their turn maintain the topology of
the received images. One may now postulate that through a cascade of dynam-
ically switched fiber projections (Anderson and Van Essen, 1987) the images of
objects are projected onto intrinsic object models, that is, models that represent
only intrinsic properties of the objects and are unaffected by perspective effects.
This is Brentano’s problem of intentionality, the problem so intensely discussed by
(Husserl, 1980), how to get from infinitely variable appearances, from the directly
given sensory patterns, to the objects themselves. After inspection from many
angles it is possible to eventually construct intrinsic models of objects. For steps
in this direction see (Wieghardt and von der Malsburg, 2000).
Here we have another chicken-and-egg problem: How can systematic projec-
tions be developed before there are invariant models and how can invariant mod-
els be generated before those projections are structured? The problem is solved
through the interplay of several basic factors.
α The relation between model and sensory data is structured by homeomorphy,
by mappings that connect neurons of the same feature type under conserva-
tion of neighborhood relations.
β During the inspection of the same object under changing perspective (trans-
lation, rotation, scaling and rotation in depth) a constant model is to be put
in relation to the varying input patterns through a set of object-independent
mappings.
γ Perspective motions (eye motions) can be initiated by the system (point iii)
by signals that have systematic relations to those motions and the corre-
sponding map transformations (“action-perception-cycle”, re-afference prin-
ciple).
δ The visual pathway from object to model is complemented by those involving
other modalities (point ii). Touch, in particular, helps to establish the three-
dimensionality of object models.
The fundamental principle that makes it possible to solve the chicken-and-egg
problem of simultaneously organizing fiber projections that compensate trans-
formations and invariant object models is consistency between alternative signal
pathways. In the object vision example, mutual consistency has to reign
• during object inspection under fixed perspective: between simultaneously
active projection fibers running between primary visual cortex and the active
model,
• during inspection of the same object under changing perspective: between
alternative sets of projection fibers, which all have to support the same model
with their signals, and finally
22
• during inspection of different objects and scenes: mutual consistency has to
reign within the whole system of world structure, memory structure and the
interlocking pathways of vision and all other modalities.
In computer simulations we have demonstrated the simultaneous generation of
projection fiber systems and object models under exploitation of points α and β
before birth (Zhu et al., 2010; Bergmann and von der Malsburg, 2011) and after
birth (Fernandes and von der Malsburg, 2015).
Consistency between signal pathways, especially also between between chang-
ing sensory signals and model predictions, is the basis for our confidence in per-
ception and for the naive realism that dominates our general outlook.
Let’s accept, for a moment, an interpretation of active neurons as represent-
ing logical propositions relevant to the present situation, and an interpretation
of the active connections as arguments relevant to the present situation. Then a
conscious state would be one in which all these reasoning chains are consistent
with each other. This may be compared with a self-consistent piece of mathe-
matics consisting of a set of theorems connected by a web of reasoning pathways
and proofs. The degree of consistency in a brain state will never be comparable
to the absolute stringency required in mathematics, but spending time observing
a limited environmental scenario (as infants do in their stable environment) and
thinking about it steadily increases that consistency within itself and with the
environment. Such imperfect but steadily increasing degree of consistency is char-
acteristic also of the grander organism of science, taken as a web of statements
and reasoning chains, which over time is getting better and better in adapting
itself to masses of experimental observations of the studied sections of the world.
Schema-Based Control of Behavior
The action-perception-loop, the interplay of seeing, moving and touching, helps us
to reconstruct the reality of our immediate environment. This is mainly a matter
of geometry and physics. Beyond that it is important, though, to interpret the
environment as arena of affordances, of opportunities for action. This is a matter of
biological significance and is based on a behavioral repertoire that has been formed
during evolution, and some elements of which we may have inherited already from
our single-celled ancestors. This repertoire is laid down by the genes in the form
of abstract schemata (point iv), which are the essential subject of ethology. A
schema S, laid down as net fragment, can be identified in a scene N on the
basis of homeomorphy with a part N ′ of N , see above. and may, through further
genetically determined connections, trigger a reaction. In addition the animal may
learn from the schema application by storing the details of the identified trigger in
memory (as in Konrad Lorenz’ instance of imprinting, where the gosling absorbs
the image of mother-goose directly after hatching) in order to tune in to the actual
environment.
We evidently share both the mechanisms of immediate perception and of
schema-controlled behavior with a large number of animal species. However, what
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distinguishes us is an extensive behavioral repertoire directed at the organization
of social interaction and communication (Tomasello, 2014; Lieberman, 2013) and,
building on that, a pyramid of schemata of immensely greater depth of abstrac-
tion, which we acquire through education and communication. This enables us
to expand perception to horizons way beyond the immediately accessible environ-
ment.
Conclusion
With this essay I claim to deliver the common functional principle postulated by
Spinoza to give rise to the very different phenomena of brain and mind. For clarity,
let me summarize my answers to the three questions that define the neural code
issue (see the second section):
1. What is the nature of the state of the brain or mind at any given moment?
That state is a self-consistent net.
2. What is the nature of memory? Memory has the form of a connectivity
pattern that is an overlay of net fragments.
3. What is the mechanism through which experience and thought form memory
content? That mechanism is network self-organization under participation
of sensory input.
These assumptions deviate from current ideas of the neurosciences in two respects.
First, existing connections between neural units switch on and off as quickly as
we think and that they are endowed with symbolic meaning on a par with that of
neurons. Second, the dominant factor determining the structure of active sets of
connections is network self-organization favoring consistency between alternative
signal pathways. The result of these modifications is a system that can be inter-
preted as describing situations by sets of currently relevant elementary assertions
(active neural units) that support each other by networks of currently relevant
deduction rules (active neural connections).
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